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Abstract 
Standard banking theory suggests that there exists an optimal level of credit risk that yields 
maximum bank profit. We identify the optimal level of risk-weighted assets that maximizes 
banks’ returns in the full sample of US banks over the period 1996–2011. We find that this 
optimal level is cyclical for the average bank, being higher than the realized credit risk in 
relatively stable periods with high profit opportunities for banks but quickly decreasing below 
the realized in periods of turmoil. We place this cyclicality into the nexus between bank risk 
and monetary policy. We show that a contractionary monetary policy in stable periods, where 
the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized credit risk, increases the gap between them. 
An increase in this gap also comes as a result of an expansionary monetary policy in bad 
economic periods, where the realized risk is higher than the optimal risk.     
 
JEL classification: G21; E5; C13; G01  
Keywords: Banks; Optimal credit risk; Profit maximization; Monetary policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We thank Iftekhar Hasan (editor), two anonymous referees, and the participants of the 3rd 
International Conference of the Financial Engineering and Banking Society for helpful 
comments. 
*Corresponding author
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Bank managers make risky decisions about the transformation of liabilities to assets so as to 
produce profits. However, they can also produce large losses if they take on too much risk or 
if structural and macroeconomic conditions change unexpectedly.1 This implies that the risk–
return relationship is nonlinear and that there should be an optimal level of credit risk. Further, 
the inherent maturity mismatch between the asset and liability sides of the bank balance sheet 
causes a problem of time inconsistency: banks might alter their optimal risk decisions in 
different times. Despite the fundamental role of this idea in any theoretical model of bank risk 
and default, the empirical literature has largely neglected distinguishing between the realized 
and optimal (equilibrium) credit risk for the average bank and over time. Thus, the important 
implications of this distinction for the monetary and macroeconomic environment have not 
been studied. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in the literature. 
 Theoretical models of the banking firm operating under adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and/or incomplete contracting assume that banks choose between risky and less risky 
assets and manage liabilities to maximize their value or profits (e.g., John, Saunders, and 
Senbet, 2000; Agur and Demertzis, 2012). Thus, banks make optimal decisions in light of the 
variable microeconomic problems they face, mostly related to informational asymmetry, and 
the regulatory and macroeconomic conditions. In this framework, equilibrium bank behavior 
can be compared and endogenized with optimality conditions for other agents (e.g., consumers 
or regulators) to study more general equilibrium relationships.  
In practice, however, the realized level of credit risk is not equal to the optimal one in 
the short term. There can be many interrelated reasons for this discrepancy and three of them 
seem to be the most important ones. First, banks, like any other firm, can simply be inefficient 
                                                          
1 In a recent paper Agur and Demertzis (2012) model a bank manager’s investment decision as a choice between 
two projects, one of which has lower expected return and higher volatility than the other.   
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and operate below capacity. In this sense, banks may fail to choose the optimal mix or level of 
risky assets, a situation exacerbated during periods of rising uncertainty (e.g., Berger, Hancock 
and Humphrey, 1993). Second, the banking sector is notoriously characterized by herding 
behavior, which is usually pegged to the choices of leading banks or to the changing 
perceptions about the regulatory and macroeconomic environment. The history of banking 
crises has shown that herding behavior can be an important element in suboptimal risk 
decisions of banks in both good and bad economic periods (e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer, 
2007). Third, and perhaps most important, the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities 
that is inherent in the banking business implies that the quality of bank balance sheets can 
quickly deteriorate in light of adverse developments due to depositor behavior in a classic 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework, credit rationing á la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and 
other well-established mechanisms. Thus, banks can find themselves in situations where in 
good times they take on less than the optimal credit risk, while in bad times they are exposed 
to higher than the optimal risk. The outcome of both these states is lower than optimal returns.                
We identify deviations between the realized and optimal bank credit risk using a simple 
empirical setup. We assume that bank profits depend on the risk decisions of bank managers 
and bank managers want to maximize returns on assets (or returns on equity if there is no 
principal agent problem). To do so, they seek the optimal level of credit risk. If bank managers 
decide to take on too little credit risk and hold a large share of liquid assets in their portfolios, 
bank profits will not be maximized. Bank returns will also be sub-optimal if bank managers 
take on too much credit risk, leading for example to the accumulation of a high volume of 
nonperforming loans (e.g., Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson, 2004). Thus, profit as a function 
of risk may be described better by an inverted U-shaped curve.  
Another important element of this setup is that the level of optimal credit risk must be 
time-varying. For instance, consider the situation in the period 2001–2007. Perceptions about 
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the stability of the banking system were really optimistic and credit risk decisions were paying 
high yields. This implies that the optimal bank credit risk is relatively high during prosperous 
periods. When the housing bubble burst, banks found themselves exposed to very risky 
positions that started yielding losses because of the surging nonperforming loans. Furthermore, 
bank managers could not adjust the level of credit risk in the very short term, mainly because 
of issues related to maturity mismatch. Thus, in periods of stress, the optimal credit risk should 
be lower than the actual credit risk held in the portfolio of the average bank.  
Using quarterly panel data for virtually all banks that operated in the United States (US) 
during the period 1996–2011, we identify the time-varying optimal level of credit risk mainly 
in terms of the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. We indeed find a cyclical movement 
of the optimal level of credit risk for the average bank, which peaks just before the eruption of 
the crisis in 2006. The optimal credit risk quickly deteriorates from 2007 onward and this leaves 
banks with a higher than optimal credit risk in the crisis period. This explicitly shows how the 
deviations between the realized and optimal credit risk, owing to the three main channels 
highlighted above, leave the average bank operating in a suboptimal way.  
These deviations have interesting implications for the monetary and the 
macroeconomic environment. A recent literature examines the interplay between banks’ risk, 
monetary policy, and macroeconomic outcomes, suggesting that a monetary expansion leads 
banks to take on higher risks (e.g., Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro, 2014; Delis, Hasan, and 
Mylonidis, 2011). Our analysis is not about identifying the potency of this mechanism, which 
is termed the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Instead, we opt for identifying a relation 
between the macroeconomic and monetary conditions, and the deviations between the optimal 
and the realized actual risk in bank portfolios. To this end, we use a vector error correction 
model (VECM) and time-series data on the federal funds rate and the median risk-weighted 
assets of US banks. We show that the optimal monetary policy from a macroeconomic 
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viewpoint increases the deviations between the realized and optimal credit of banks, thus 
pushing banks to a suboptimal disequilibrium situation. In line with our result, Agur and 
Demertzis (2013) use a relevant theoretical model and show that because bank risk is sticky, 
monetary policy should keep rate cuts short to prevent excessive risk buildup. 
Specifically, in good economic periods, the Fed has incentives to increase the interest 
rates. In these periods, where the optimal level of banks’ credit risk is higher than the realized 
risk, we show that a monetary contraction will not only decrease the realized credit risk (in line 
with the existence of a risk-taking channel) but also increase the optimal level of credit risk. 
Similarly, in periods of turmoil in the banking sector, where the optimal level of banks’ credit 
risk is lower than the realized risk, we show that a monetary expansion will increase the realized 
credit risk and decrease the optimal level of credit risk. Therefore, in both good and bad periods, 
the “optimal” monetary policy choices by the Fed aiming at smoothing the business cycle, force 
the realized level of banks’ credit risk out of equilibrium. We contend that this finding has 
important policy implications for both the conduct of monetary policy and the prudential 
regulation of banks.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model used 
to estimate the optimal level of credit risk on the basis of specific theoretical considerations. 
Section 3 discusses the data set and the estimation method. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results from the estimation of the optimal credit risk. Section 5 examines the macroeconomic 
relations between the optimal level of credit risk, the realized credit risk, and the monetary 
conditions.  Section 6 concludes the paper.     
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2. Identification of the optimal credit risk 
2.1. Profitability equation and risky assets 
Most theoretical studies model the banking firm as a wealth- or profit-maximizing entity. The 
premise is that banks use a set of inputs to invest in risky assets with a high return and in less 
risky assets with a low return (e.g., John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000). The bank is also 
required to hold a fair amount of reserves with the central bank, as well as capital to absorb 
losses. Thus, the basic banking model can consider the presence of reserve requirements, 
capital regulation, or other forms of intervention. The bank decides on the optimal allocation 
of resources of high- and low-risk assets given its budget constraint and the “safe and sound” 
banking constraint posed by the regulator (e.g., Kim and Santomero, 1988). One can also think 
that the bank has its own soundness constraint if its decision is to maximize wealth or profits 
subject to minimizing the probability of default. This relates to the notion of the market 
discipline of the banking firm (e.g., Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).    
Hughes and Mester (1994; 1998) provide an influential empirical counterpart of this 
theoretical framework. The first of these studies tests whether bank managers are acting in the 
shareholders’ interest and maximizing expected profits or a utility function that trades off risk 
for return. The findings rule in favor of the trade-off between profit and risk. The second study 
shows that in a similar model of the banking firm, banks of different size classes exhibit 
behavior consistent with risk aversion.  
This basic modeling of the banking firm yields a profit equation of the form (or similar 
to): 
𝛱 = 𝑝1𝑦1 + 𝑝2𝑦2 + 𝑝3𝑦3 − 𝐶(∑ 𝑦
3
𝑛=1 , 𝑤) − 𝑝𝑘𝐾 (1) 
In this profit function, y1 is the quantity of the risky asset (credit risk), which earns an average 
interest rate p1. The interest rate on the risk-free asset y2 is p2 and p3y3 is the revenue from other 
sources not directly related with credit risk. We can consider that y1 + y2 represents the total 
7 
 
assets of bank i used to generate profits, while 3 3p y  represents the noninterest income. Bank 
outputs are produced using input prices w and the bank draws capital K (at some rate pk), which 
can be of the form of equity capital or debt-based capital.  
 
2.2. Empirical model and the distinction between the short- and the long-run  
In the empirical banking literature (e.g., Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2010), the identification of 
the factors explaining profits comes from a specification where the returns on assets or equity 
are regressed on a number of bank characteristics including those of equation (1). As profits 
are normalized with respect to the total assets or equity, it is usual practice to normalize the 
rest of the bank characteristics, including the variable used as a measure of credit risk y. Further, 
John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000), among others, assume that the representative bank 
maximizes expected profits by deciding on the optimal mix of risky and riskless assets, while 
standard microeconomic theory suggests that the profit function will be concave in y1 if the 
cost function is convex (Hughes and Mester, 1994).   
 These considerations point to a non-linear relationship between profits and credit risk. 
The intuition of such an empirical modelling choice comes from quadratic objective functions 
in portfolio management that first appeared in Markowitz (1959). In our paper, the assumption 
on the non-linear relation between credit risk and profits is mostly based on the fact that banks 
must take credit risks to maximize their profits, but taking too much credit risk might result in 
losses. Empirical equations with squared terms are commonly used to describe maximization 
problems in the literature (e.g., Dell’ Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez, 2014, for a recent 
example). Simplicity facilitates our aim, which is to estimate a risk-return relationship in terms 
of portfolio management and not to provide a general equilibrium model for bank profits. The 
latter would require taking into account the price setting behavior of a bank as a competitive 
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firm and the informational problems that exist between borrowers and lenders; such a model is 
significantly more complicated and beyond the scope of this paper. 
To identify the global maximum point, where the marginal impact of credit risk (i.e., 
the risky assets) turns negative, we estimate the following profit equation: 
 𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑎3𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,     (2) 
where Π is the return on assets (or equity) of bank i at time t; r ≡ y1 denotes credit risk, c is a 
vector of control variables observed at the bank level that include, inter alia, the risk-free asset; 
and u is the disturbance. Here uit can be analyzed as 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,         (3) 
where λt denotes time fixed effects, vi denotes bank fixed effects, and eit is the remainder 
disturbance. The presence of the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables is 
in line with the evidence that bank profits persist (Goddard, Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson, 2011). 
From equation (2), we identify the level of r that maximizes Π by setting the partial derivative 
of Π with respect to r equal to zero, i.e.,  
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝑟
= 0 => 𝑟 = −
𝑎1
2𝑎2
.        (4) 
 Equation (2) also implies an unconstrained maximization problem for the managers. A 
major factor which is against this assumption is bank regulation. Regulation may either reduce 
(ceteris-paribus) the desired risk by a requirement in capital, i.e. the Basel Accord requires 
banks to hold capital of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets, or may increase the risk taken by 
providing implicit protection to “systemic” or “too-big-to-fail” banks (Kaufman, 2014). 
However, regulation constraints are time invariant and individual specific, i.e. the capital 
constraints apply ever since the first Basel Accord and very few banks show a dramatic change 
in status, thus are captured by the bank fixed effects 𝑣𝑖.  
 Also, bank herding behaviour, which may come from information contagion, can be 
described by cross section dependence and is captured by λt which is common across banks. In 
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this way, bank limited liability is also captured given its correlation with herding behaviour 
(e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). 
An important distinction should be made here between the short- and the long-run 
objectives of the bank. Even though the distinction is somewhat blurry, most theoretical work 
on the objectives of the banking firm assumes a financial soundness constraint in place that 
implies long-term value maximization (e.g., Valencia, 2011). However, the majority of this 
work includes models that are static and have a short-term horizon based on expected profits, 
reflecting the idea of informational asymmetries due to agency problems (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). For example, because of information asymmetries between bank managers 
and owners or investors, the bank value can be driven by short-term results on profits, thus 
providing incentives to the bank managers to focus on these results at the expense of the long-
term value-related targets of the bank.2  
 In line with the short-term profit-maximization literature, in our study we focus on the 
estimation of the optimal short-run bank credit risk. Thus, we do not provide any implications 
on the long-run equilibrium credit risk (where markets would clear) that maximizes value given 
a financial wealth constraint. We just provide inference on the potential short-run 
disequilibrium credit risk that bank managers would take to maximize short-term profits.        
 
3. Data and estimation method 
3.1. Data 
We obtain bank-level quarterly data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
Call reports. We start with the full sample of US commercial banks for the period 1996Q1 to 
                                                          
2 Clearly, short-term profit maximization does not necessarily increase shareholder value in the long run, a result 
that is well-documented also in the banking literature (Livne, Markarian, and Mironov, 2013, and Davies et al., 
2014).  However, studies like Keeley (1990) and Matutes and Vives (1996) suggest that in fairly competitive 
banking systems, such as the US one after the liberalization process in the late 1980s, the tradeoff between short- 
and long-term profit behavior favors the former.  
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2011Q4, but we drop a number of observations where the values of our main variables are quite 
unreasonable (e.g., negative values of bank assets). The reason our sample starts in 1996 is that 
data on risk-weighted assets, our main measure of risky assets, are unavailable before this date. 
Our final sample consists of 574,532 observations. Table 1 provides formal definitions for the 
variables used in the empirical analysis and Table 2 reports summary statistics. 
[Insert Tables 1&2 about here] 
 We measure bank profits using the return on assets and equity in alternative 
specifications. While deciding on the risk strategy of banks, most bank managers consider the 
return on assets as the most important measure of bank profits (e.g., Hughes and Mester, 1994). 
In turn, a high return on equity is the primary objective of bank shareholders. Given that we 
are primarily interested in risk decisions, which are made by bank managers, we use the return 
on assets as our main dependent variable and provide sensitivity analysis on the basis of the 
return on equity.  
Concerning the measures of high- and low-risk assets, we follow the regulatory 
definition of risky and riskless assets from the FDIC (2012). In particular, we use the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets (named risk-weighted assets) as our main proxy for the risky 
decisions of bank managers. In calculating this ratio different weights are assigned to different 
types of bank assets under the guidelines of the Basel Accord (e.g., Basel, 2011) and, thus, this 
ratio also encompasses information on the risk of the mix of different types of assets as in most 
theoretical banking models (e.g., John, Suanders, and Senbet, 2000). Further, risk-weighted 
assets measures ex ante as opposed to ex post risk of banks and this is the main reason it is 
favored by bank regulators and used in our empirical analysis. Specifically, our theoretical 
propositions on the optimal level of risk refer to ex ante bank risk, i.e. the risk position that 
bank managers obtain in a speculative manner to maximize profits. Naturally, at this time bank 
managers do not know the realized level of risk ex post.  
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The Basel accord also explains why using a risk-weight approach is the preferred 
methodology for the calculation of the risk position of banks. First, this ratio provides an easier 
approach to compare the riskiness of banks within and across countries; second, off-balance-
sheet exposures can be easily included in capital adequacy calculations; and third banks are not 
deterred from carrying low risk liquid assets in their books. One could further differentiate 
between the various risky assets to obtain a more complex picture of the risk decisions of bank 
managers. For example, we may consider separate categories of loans bearing different risk 
weights under Basel II (e.g. Barakova and Pavlia, 2014). However, the purpose of this study is 
to identify the optimal bank risk for the average bank in terms of total credit risk and not to 
provide a complex analysis of the shares of various risky assets in bank portfolios.  
The risk-weighted assets ratio is, however, criticized by a recent strand of literature on 
the basis of manipulation by banks or minimal sensitivity to market risk (e.g., Mariathasan and 
Merrouche, 2014; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Acharya, Engle, and Pierret, 2014). To this 
end, we examine the sensitivity of our findings by using the ratio of 30-89 days delinquent 
loans to total loans (delinquent loans) as an alternative ex ante measure of credit risk. This 
measure has the advantage that is not subject to over-manipulation by banks. However, this 
measure does not reflect the entire gamut of the credit risk activities by banks and might be 
less useful in its forecasting ability if delinquencies are the result of systemic risk hitting the 
banking industry and not the idiosyncratic behavior of each bank (i.e., delinquencies start to 
rise simultaneously with the systemic problems of the whole banking sector).3 Further, 
delinquencies arrive after the “risk-taking” decision of bank managers to maximize profits: if 
managers new that the loans would fall into this category, the profit-maximization principle 
would imply the avoidance of the specific loan contracts.  
                                                          
3 See e.g. Delis, Hasan, and Tsionas (2014). 
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To control for the riskless assets in bank portfolios we use the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets (liquidity). Further, to avoid associating ex ante bank risk with risk arising ex post, 
we also control for the level of problem loans and loan-loss provisions (see Table 1 for explicit 
definitions). The inclusion of the problem-loans variable (named problem loans) suggests that 
bank managers make risk decisions today while knowing the level of problem loans in their 
portfolios. Similar to problem loans, the provisions variable (named provisions) does not 
capture the level of risk-taking per se, but it relates to managers’ expectations about future 
losses in case of adverse developments (e.g. Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2012). Given that these 
expectations may or may not be realized, provisions represents another aspect of credit risk 
reflecting the level of bank managers’ risk aversion. Thus, we assume that problem loans, 
provisions, and risk-weighted assets should be simultaneously included in our model, while we 
confirm in sensitivity analysis that exclusion of the former two variables does not yield 
significantly different results. Table 3.1 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between 
the variables used in our empirical analysis for the full sample (the one using risk-weighted 
assets) and Table 3.2 the equivalent ones for the sample including delinquent loans. Evidently, 
the correlation coefficients between all the risk-related variables are quite small. 
[Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here] 
 For the empirical estimation of equation (2), we use a number of additional bank-level 
control variables. In particular, we control for (i) bank size using the natural logarithm of real 
total assets (deflated by the GDP deflator), (ii) bank capital using the ratio of equity capital to 
the total assets (and/or the ratio of the risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets), and (iii) other 
sources of bank income using the ratio of the noninterest income to total income. The use of 
bank size and capital allow controlling for the profits arising from economies of scale and 
imperfections in capital markets, respectively. The noninterest income variable captures profits 
generated from nontraditional bank activities and is controlled for to prevent the risk-weighted 
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assets variable from capturing the impact of these activities on bank profits (e.g. Karim, Liadze, 
Barrell, and Davis, 2013). All these are in line with the discussion of equation (2).4  
An important feature of the data from the Call reports is that many of the variables 
display high seasonality. This is mostly the case with bank profits. Within each year, the lowest 
profits are observed on average in quarter 1 and the highest profits are observed in quarter 4. 
A similar pattern is observed to a different degree with many other of our bank-level variables. 
To avoid introducing a bias in our results because of the differences in the level of seasonality 
between the dependent and explanatory variables, we seasonally adjust the data. Specifically, 
we estimate equations of the form 
  𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐷2 + 𝑏2𝐷3 + 𝑏3𝐷4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,      (5) 
where xit is one of Πit, rit, cit and D2, D3, D4 are equal to 1 in quarters 2, 3, and 4, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. The estimation method for equation (5) is OLS on the fixed effects model. 
Then, we calculate the seasonally adjusted variables as  
𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝜀?̂?𝑡.          (6) 
In some of the estimated equations, where we do not use time effects as in equation (3), 
we include a number of variables common to all banks that characterize the macroeconomic 
environment. First, we capture the changing macroeconomic conditions using the GDP growth 
rate. Second, we use the ratio of the dollar value of loans provided by commercial banks over 
GDP. This variable captures changes in the average credit conditions nationally.5 These 
variables drop out when using time effects; thus, we employ them only to check the robustness 
of our results. Our data source for these variables is the Federal Reserve. 
 
                                                          
4 We experiment with many other bank-specific control variables, such as the ratios of loans to assets, loans to 
deposits, and cost to income. The main results remain unaffected. 
5 We experiment with many other macroeconomic variables as well as with regional dummies, etc. The results 
remain unaffected and are available on request. 
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3.2. Estimation of the profitability equation    
It is widely recognized in the banking literature that bank characteristics like risk and capital 
are endogenous in the profitability equation. A first concern, which is the most important in 
our case, relates to reverse causality. For example, a profitable bank will use part of the profits 
made at time t as loanable funds and another part as capital, creating an obvious reverse 
causality mechanism between banks’ returns and risk and equity capital. The richness of the 
data set (especially the quarterly time dimension) allows us to mitigate problems arising from 
reverse causality by using the first lags of the explanatory variables instead of their 
contemporaneous values. Thus, we assume that the bank characteristics at quarter t-1 determine 
profits at time t.6 In this sense, we can rewrite equation (2) as 
     𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏𝛱𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝑎3𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.    (7) 
Equation (7) is in line with the theoretical suggestion that bank managers decide on the level 
of credit risk today to materialize returns in a future date (e.g., Agur and Demertzis, 2012). To 
capture a different time pattern, where credit risk today materializes in returns at another 
quarter in the future, we also experiment with the fourth time lag on r and we show that this 
does not affect the results. Assuming no other source of endogeneity for the right-hand-side 
variables, we can estimate equation (7) with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors (e.g., Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2010).7    
However, another source of endogeneity can arise from omitted variables bias. For 
example, risk-weighted assets and bank profits can move in the same direction owing to 
                                                          
6 It would be more problematic to establish causality if we had annual data. In that case, profits would have been 
determined by the bank’s characteristics in the previous year. However, in empirical banking studies, one year 
can be a time period within which major changes can occur that affect bank performance.    
7 As is well-known in the econometrics literature, estimation of an equation like (7) with a fixed effects model is, 
in general, inconsistent because of the correlation between the fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable. 
However, for panels with large time and cross-sectional dimensions, the estimates from different methods 
converge (Baltagi, 2008). We confirm this in the empirical analysis below.  
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changes in the structural and macroeconomic conditions common to all banks. Further, it could 
be the case that the relationship between risk-weighted assets and banks’ returns is affected by 
certain bank characteristics that are not controlled for in the empirical model. However, note 
that the empirical model includes both bank and time fixed effects, and these should lessen 
such a bias. To confirm that this type of endogeneity does not drive our results, we also use 
instrumental variables procedures such as the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) 
for panel data with robust standard errors or the two-stage system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) of Blundell and Bond (1998) with robust standard errors (correction of 
Windmeijer, 2005). 
LIML is a two-stage procedure that requires at least one instrumental variable that does 
not have a direct effect on bank profitability or an effect running through omitted variables 
(i.e., validate the exclusion restriction). To this end, we use the implications of the recent 
literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (e.g., Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro, 
2014; Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis, 2011). This literature shows that low interest rates increase 
the average risk-taking behavior of banks for three main reasons. First, a shift from a high to 
low interest rate environment could leave financial institutions with long-term fixed rate 
contracts, seeking out riskier investments in an attempt to meet their liabilities (search-for-yield 
effect). Second, low rates boost asset and collateral values and tend to reduce price volatility, 
which in turn downsize bank estimates of probabilities of default and encourage higher risk 
positions (Borio and Zhu, 2008). Third, the commitment, for example, of a central bank for 
lower (future) interest rates in the case of a threatening shock reduces the probability of large 
downside risks, thereby encouraging banks to assume greater risk (transparency effect). Given 
the above, there should be a direct impact of monetary policy on banks’ credit risk. 
In addition, the exclusion restriction is validated if there is no significant correlation 
between the monetary policy variable and the stochastic term u in (7). One may argue that bank 
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profits could in fact react to a change in monetary policy (i) if this change is correlated with 
the general structural and macroeconomic conditions and (ii) through the noninterest income 
that is excluded from the risk-weighted assets. Concerning the first argument and in addition 
to the use of time fixed effects, we consider the exogenous monetary policy shocks. These are 
estimated using the so-called Taylor rule residuals obtained from the OLS regression of the 
federal funds rate on GDP growth and inflation (e.g., Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011; Brissimis, 
Delis, and Iosifidi, 2012). Concerning the second argument, the inclusion of noninterest income 
among the control variables reassures that the exogenous monetary shocks are not correlated 
with profits through their impact on sources of bank profits other than interest income.  
For the estimation of equation (7) using GMM, we augment the Taylor rule residuals 
with the second lags of all explanatory variables as instruments. By including the second lags 
as instruments (and not the first), we assume that all explanatory variables might be, to some 
extent, endogenous regressors in equation (7). This set of instruments produces acceptable 
values for the test for second-order autocorrelation and for the Hansen test for overidentifying 
restrictions (for details on these issues, see Roodman, 2009).  
However, before moving on to the analysis of the estimation results, we should note 
that what we seek is the robust estimation of the optimal level of credit risk from equation (4) 
given (2). We will show below that all three estimators considered (OLS on the fixed effects 
model, LIML, and GMM) yield more or less the same values for the optimal credit risk. We 
primarily attribute this to the fact that in very large panels such as ours, the results from all 
estimators converge and the fixed effects estimator becomes consistent as the time dimension 
of the panel increases (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, in our setting, even the simplest estimation 
methods, such as OLS, seem to produce robust estimates of the optimal credit risk.   
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4. Estimation results for the optimal credit risk 
4.1. Baseline estimation results and robustness 
Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of alternative specifications of equation (7). In 
all regressions, the dependent variable is the return on assets, except from that in column (10), 
where we use the return on equity. In line with the discussion in Section 2.1, all the results 
verify that the relationship between credit risk and bank profitability is an inverted U-shape. In 
column (1), we start with a very simple model, which is estimated by OLS and fixed effects. 
In column (2), we add quarter fixed effects. The results from these first two specifications yield 
values for the optimal level of credit risk equal to 0.666 and 0.717, respectively (we report the 
optimal point in the line below the results for the coefficient estimates). The first value is 
approximately equal to the mean value of risk-weighted assets in our sample (see Table 2), and 
the second is slightly higher, showing that the average bank in our panel could benefit by taking 
on a slightly higher amount of credit risk.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In columns (3) and (4), we introduce a number of bank-level control variables in the 
equations with and without quarter fixed effects, respectively. The results show a slight 
decrease in the value of the optimal credit risk in the model without quarter effects, while the 
optimal point in the model with quarter effects is about the same as the equivalent in column 
(2). We feel that this pattern in the results comes from the importance of including quarter fixed 
effects in reducing the omitted variables bias. Moreover, in column (5), we drop the quarter 
effects and add year effects among the explanatory variables, and this yields very similar results 
to those in column (4). Further, in columns (6) and (7), we introduce the two macroeconomic 
variables, named Growth and Credit by banks. To do this, we drop the quarter effects (due to 
collinearity) and only add year effects in column (7). Evidently, both the coefficient estimates 
and the level of optimal bank credit risk remain practically unaffected.    
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 So far, we have estimated equation (7) using OLS. We now relax the assumption that 
there is no endogeneity arising from omitted variables bias and use LIML and GMM for 
dynamic panels. We present the results from these regressions in columns (8) and (9). The 
results from the LIML and GMM estimates show that the optimal level of credit risk is 0.7 and 
0.727, respectively. Thus, the optimal level of credit risk is not significantly driven by the 
estimation method. We also confirm this finding for the other specifications of equation (7). 
This is an expected finding because for large panels the results from all estimators converge 
(Baltagi, 2008). Thus, the OLS model with bank fixed effects and quarter fixed effects seems 
to be sufficient to robustly estimate the optimal level of credit risk, and is the one favored in 
the rest of the specifications owing to its simplicity and asymptotic efficiency.  
In column (10) we examine the sensitivity of the results to the use of the return on 
equity as the dependent variable. We find that the optimal level of credit risk is equal to 0.715, 
which is almost equal to the equivalent specification with the return on assets as the dependent 
variable, i.e., that in column (4). Further, in column (11) we control for the bank regulatory 
capital ratio instead of the total capital ratio and in column (12) we control for both ratios. The 
reason is that safety and soundness might not be based only on total equity capital but also on 
regulatory capital. The two ratios have a correlation coefficient equal to 0.82 (see Table 3.1) 
and the results in columns (10) and (11) of Table 4 are a clear indication of collinearity. 
Importantly, however, the optimal level of risk remains at levels approximately equal to those 
of the previous regressions.  
In Table 5 we examine the sensitivity of our results to the use of delinquent loans as 
our measure for bank credit risk. The inverted U-shaped relation between risk and returns 
continues to hold. Also, the optimal points on the delinquent loans are somewhat above the 
average of delinquent loans (equal to 0.013), irrespective of whether we control for the major 
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loan categories (see column 2) or whether we use the return on equity instead of the return on 
assets. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
As a final sensitivity analysis of these baseline results, we consider whether the optimal 
level of credit risk changes when we assume a different time structure for our data or a different 
lag structure for risk-weighted assets. We first use annual and bi-annual averages of our data, 
instead of quarterly data. This allows examining whether bank managers have a longer-term 
horizon in their decision-making on credit risk.8 We report the results in columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 6 and we find that the results are equivalent to those of Table 4.    
Next, we report the results from a model where the lagged dependent variable is 
excluded from the analysis (column 3 of Table 6). The coefficient estimates on risk-weighted 
assets and its squared term gain somewhat in economic significance, but the optimal point is 
not significantly affected. Further, we simultaneously use the first three lags of risk-weighted 
assets and its squared term in column (4). This specification implicitly assumes that the risk 
decisions of bank managers in quarters t-1 to t-3 affect bank performance at time t. Adding up 
the coefficients from the three lags and taking the derivative as in equation (4) yields an optimal 
level of credit risk very similar to that reported in Table 4.  
Finally, in column (5), we report the results from the specification where risk-weighted 
assets and its squared term are lagged four times (i.e., we use the annual lag). In this 
specification, we assume that the risk decisions of banks at quarter t-4 affect the profitability 
at quarter t. Under this assumption, the level of the optimal credit risk equals 0.67, which is 
only 0.04 points lower than the one identified in column (4) of Table 4. We consider many 
other variants for the lag structure of the risk-weighted assets, including the simultaneous 
                                                          
8 Using annual and bi-annual data also allows reducing our sample size and examining the sensitivity of the main 
regression coefficients and the optimal point of credit risk.  
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inclusion of the first four, first eight, and first 16 lags. Changes in the optimal level of credit 
risk are not significant and these results are available on request.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In Table 7 we extend our analysis by using subsamples of banks based on their size and 
capitalization. The first regression is based on a subsample of banks with total assets above the 
90th percentile of the full sample, while the second regression on banks with total assets below 
the 50th percentile (a summary of these percentiles with the corresponding cut-off values is 
given in Table 8). The results show that the large banks have a lower optimal point compared 
to the small banks, which is intuitive given their more complex organizational structure, the 
wider array of products, and the increasing holdings of short-term assets that bear lower risk 
weights.9 In turn, columns (3) and (4) report the equivalent results for the well-capitalized and 
the poorly-capitalized banks, respectively. In line with our expectations, we find that poorly 
capitalized banks have a lower optimal level of credit risk (these banks have a lower capacity 
to take on credit risk).  
[Insert Table 7 & Table 8 about here] 
 So far, we have identified that the optimal level of credit risk for the average bank in 
our sample is between 0.69 and 0.71 for the most prominent specifications of equation (7). 
These values are somewhat higher than the actual value of risk-weighted assets for the average 
bank, showing that banks could on average gain in their short-term profitability by increasing 
their risk. The coefficient estimate in column (4) of Table 4 shows that a one standard deviation 
increase in risk-weighted assets will increase the return on assets of the average bank by 
approximately 0.04 points (up to the point where risk-weighted assets equals 0.71). Thus, for 
example, a 0.04 increase in risk-weighted assets from 0.67 to 0.71 will raise the return on assets 
                                                          
9 We carry out the same analysis using the 50bn USD as the threshold for large banks (instead of the 90th 
percentile). The results are very similar to those reported in column (1) of Table 6. 
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by approximately 0.0016. Considering that the return on assets for the average bank equals 
0.007, this is a very large increase (approximately equal to 23%). Of course, this result is valid 
under the assumption that the optimal point is constant across time and banks with different 
characteristics. We relax this assumption below.    
 
4.2. Time-varying optimal credit risk 
In this section, we consider whether the optimal level of credit risk varies with time. To identify 
this time-varying optimal level, we consider estimating the equation 
𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑏𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑎3𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 +     
∑ 𝑓𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=3 𝑞𝑗𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=3 𝑞𝑗𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + ∑ ℎ𝑗𝑞𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=3 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,    (8) 
where qj are quarter dummies. Therefore, in equation (8), we obtain time-varying coefficients 
for r and r2 by interacting these variables with the quarter fixed effects.10 Subsequently, we 
calculate the optimal level of credit risk at each quarter t from the equation  
𝜕𝛱𝑡
𝜕𝑟𝑡−1
= 0 => 𝑟𝑡−1 = −
𝑎1+𝑓𝑗
2(𝑎2+𝑔𝑗)
 .       (9) 
 In Table 9, we present the estimation results from three different specifications of 
equation (8).11 In the first two columns, we present the results from equations with the return 
on assets and the return on equity as dependent variables. In column (3), we present the 
equivalent results when we use delinquent loans instead of risk-weighted assets.   
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In Figure 1, we plot the time-varying coefficient estimates (solid line), along with 
associated confidence intervals, against the quarterly average of risk-weighted assets (realized 
credit risk). Clearly, the two are not equal, reflecting a short-term disequilibrium in the handling 
                                                          
10 One could instead consider a time-varying model (e.g., Swamy, 1970). However, this class of models does not 
run for a panel with a size such as ours using a CORE i7vPro processor and 6.00 GB of RAM. 
11 Owing to space considerations, we do not replicate the full set of results in Tables 4 to 7. We rely on the 
equivalent specifications to the ones presented in columns (4) and (10) of Table 4 and of column (1) of Table 5. 
Similar to the findings in Section 3.1, changes in the results from using the other specifications are insignificant.  
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of risk-weighted assets by bank managers. The quarterly trend of the optimal risk reveals an 
interesting pattern. During the relatively good periods for the economy, the optimal level of 
credit risk is above the average credit risk, while the opposite is true after relatively bad periods. 
For example, consider the period before the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001. For 
about two years after the attack, the optimal level of credit risk remained below its average 
value. Subsequently, in most of the period 2003–2007, which is a period of considerable 
expansion in risk-weighted assets, the optimal credit risk is again higher than the average. 
Finally, since 2008, the optimal credit risk remains at the lowest level of our sample period, 
well below the realized level of credit risk.     
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 This observed pattern has a number of economic implications. First and most obvious, 
the optimal level of credit risk leads the business cycle, while the realized credit risk follows 
the business cycle closely. Second, during good economic periods, the average bank has clear 
incentives to take on higher credit risk to maximize profits. However, this optimal bank 
behavior changes very quickly when adverse shocks hit the economy, leaving banks exposed 
to higher than optimal levels of risk. This stems from (i) the standard issue of maturity 
mismatch between bank assets and liabilities, (ii) the changing informational asymmetry 
(moral hazard and adverse selection) over the business and credit cycles, which cause changes 
in the efficient intermediation of funds (e.g. Duran and Lozano-Vivas, 2014), and (iii) the 
herding behavior of banks, which can cause by itself a disequilibrium situation in the risk-
taking behavior of the banking sector. It is fairly obvious from Figure 1 that banks could not 
lower the level of credit risk close to the optimal level when the depth of the financial crisis 
became apparent in 2008. This is most probably owing to the fact that banks could not lower 
the volume of long-term loans, many of which were in fact nonperforming. 
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 There are two more implications emerging from Figure 1. On the one hand, the average 
bank has clear economic incentives to take on higher credit risk during good economic times 
in search for yield. Yet, what is optimal from the micromanagerial perspective is far from 
optimal from the macroprudential perspective. Phrased differently, the level of credit risk that 
maximizes bank profits can be unsustainable in the long run, either because of the inability of 
banks to adjust their portfolios quickly in case of adverse developments or because of myopic 
behavior attributed to herding. On the other hand, the average bank does not have to be the one 
causing the crisis. It can take only a small number of very risky players to increase systemic 
risk to very high levels. Therefore, the fact that the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized 
one for some time before 2007 does not necessarily mean that this average bank behavior 
caused the subprime meltdown. Clearly, this requires additional analysis.    
 We can check this latter hypothesis by examining the risky behavior of the banks that 
failed in the period 2008–2009. In Figure 2, we replicate Figure 1, but we also add the quarterly 
average of risk-weighted assets of the banks that failed. Evidently, these banks have an average 
ratio of risk-weighted assets higher than the optimal level in almost the entire 2001–2008 
period. This observation makes a case for bad managerial decisions for the involved banks, 
lack of private monitoring and market discipline, as well as inefficient supervision.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 In Figure 3 we examine the time path of the optimal credit risk using delinquent loans 
as our credit-risk measure (coefficients obtained from column 3 of Table 9). Even though 
delinquent loans have only increased contemporaneously with the eruption of the crisis in 2007 
(i.e., this measure does not capture the increase in bank risk in the period 2002-2006), we do 
find evidence (with a lag) for a similar cyclical pattern for the optimal credit risk. Specifically, 
in the period 2005-2007 the optimal credit risk is above the mean delinquent loans, while from 
2008 onward the optimal value falls below the mean delinquent loans. The lag in this 
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cyclicality vis-à-vis the findings on risk-weighted assets reflects the fact that the latter measure 
of credit risk better proxies, for the goals of our study, the ex ante risk-management decisions 
of bank managers.       
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 In Figures 4 to 7 we plot the time-varying coefficient estimates from the results of Table 
10. Figure 4 shows the optimal credit risk for the large banks and reveals that this optimal level 
fares very close to the average level of risk-weighted assets. In contrast, Figure 5 shows that it 
is the medium and smaller banks that mostly generate the cyclical behavior of optimal credit 
risk shown in Figure 1. Similarly, we find a major difference between the time paths of optimal 
credit risk for the well- and the poorly-capitalized banks (Figures 6 and 7, respectively). For 
the well-capitalized banks, the time path looks quite similar to the one of Figure 4. In contrast, 
for the poorly-capitalized banks the optimal credit risk is lower than their average in the period 
2005Q3 to 2008Q1.     
[Insert Table 10 & Figures 4-7 about here] 
 These findings have some important implications. First, the large, systemically 
important banks seem to have the technological expertise to operate closer to their risk-taking 
capacity in both good and bad economic periods. However, this also reveals that they are on 
average more risky compared to the smaller banks that have a substantial gap between the 
optimal and the realized credit risk in normal economic periods. Second, the poorly-capitalized 
banks “gamble for resurrection” in the period before the eruption of the crisis. This finding is 
in line with the theoretical implications of Murdock, Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) and calls for 
better regulatory monitoring of the risk-taking behavior of the banks with low levels of 
capital.12   
                                                          
12 On the same line, Delis, Staikouras, and Tsoumas (2013) show that high risk-weighted asset ratios tend to attract 
supervisory intervention, albeit in a rather delayed manner that amplifies the risk of insolvency.   
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5. Optimal credit risk and the macroeconomic environment 
5.1. Theoretical considerations 
The subprime financial and the subsequent euro-area crises recalled, in the most emphatic way, 
the importance of the banking sector in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. In Figure 1 we infer 
that the cyclicality of the optimal bank credit risk is a leading indicator of the business cycle 
and that realized credit risk is procyclical. Thus, the two indicators allow drawing some new 
insights into the interplay between banks’ risk and the monetary and macroeconomic 
environment.  
 In Section 3.2, we highlight the main mechanisms through which low interest rates can 
increase bank risk and show that the empirical literature rules in favor of a negative relation 
between monetary policy rates and bank risk. The theory behind the risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy provides more mixed results. The models typically assume that banks choose 
their asset mix and leverage to maximize profits (e.g., Agur and Demertzis, 2012; Dell’ Ariccia, 
Laeven, and Marquez, 2014). This setup allows banks to choose between a continuum of risky 
assets and different risk profiles. In either way, these theoretical frameworks predict that the 
nexus between monetary policy and bank risk depends on many factors, including the relative 
health of the banking system, the efficiency level of banks, and the state of the macroeconomic 
environment.  
From our viewpoint, the studies by Agur and Demertzis (2012; 2013) are quite 
important in that banks choose their asset profile according to their efficiency. This is relevant 
to our empirical model in that inefficient banking can cause deviations from the optimal level 
of risk. Thus, by affecting both the cost of debt financing (thus also the realized credit risk) and 
the optimal debt choice of the bank, monetary policy can affect the gap between the realized 
26 
 
and the optimal credit risk. The issue here is that an expansionary monetary policy positively 
affects asset and collateral values, and banks appear to have less risky portfolios. In other 
words, this mechanism is about the risk already present in bank portfolios and not solely about 
new risk. Our measures of realized and optimal credit risk correspond exactly to this theoretical 
interpretation of the nexus between monetary policy and bank risk, making our variables ideal 
to study the macroeconomic implications of optimal vs. realized credit risk.  
In this framework, our analysis is concerned with testing macroeconomic equilibrium 
relationships among the monetary conditions, realized credit risk taken by banks, and optimal 
risk that maximizes bank profits within a time-series setting. This strategy has the obvious 
advantage of considering a limited number of variables and using all these variables as 
endogenous. With these issues in mind we proceed to the time-series empirical analysis.  
 
5.2. Empirical analysis  
We capture the complex interactions between the relevant variables with a system of equations 
approach, which allows for rich dynamics; namely, we apply an atheoretical VAR model. This 
model is used instead of the usual structural simultaneous equation model because the 
underlying theory dictating the variables in the structural system of equations for the subject at 
hand has not yet been well-established. In this way we avoid the a priori distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous variables and we do not have to impose arbitrary constraints to 
ensure identification. Given that many of the relevant variables are non-stationary, a variant of 
the VAR model will be used, namely the VECM (see also Granger, 2004). 
The VECM takes the form 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝐹𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑗𝛥𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 + 𝑒𝑡 ,                (10) 
where Y is the (4X1) vector of endogenous variables, F and Γi are (4X4) matrices, and p is the 
lag length of the corresponding VAR. The disturbances 𝑒𝑡 are assumed to follow a four-
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dimensional Gaussian process with a zero mean and a nonsingular, finite, covariance matrix 
Ω. The four endogenous variables we use are (i) the federal funds rate (ffr) as our measure of 
the monetary conditions,13 (ii) the series of the optimal bank risk (optimal risk), (iii) the series 
of the realized bank risk (realized risk), and (iv) real output (measured by the log of real GDP). 
The results from two unit root tests, namely the Augmented Dickey Fuller (Said and 
Dickey, 1984) and the GLS Dickey Fuller (Elliott et al., 1996) tests, show that all four variables 
are stationary in first differences (Table 11). Thus, the above series are well-modeled by unit 
root processes and the use of the VECM model is necessary.  
Two or more unit root processes may behave erratically at the individual level but there 
may be a surprising relationship that binds them together: their distance is never too big. This 
means that in the long run there is an equilibrium, which can be described from the model 𝑦𝑡 =
𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, where  𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑡 is the relation between the two variables in equilibrium and 𝑢𝑡 is 
the stationary error term describing the short-run deviations from this equilibrium. If such a 
long-run relationship exists then, in the time-series terminology, the variables are said to be 
cointegrated and [1 β]' is called the cointegrating vector, which determines the long run 
equilibrium.  
To test for cointegration, we employ Johansen’s (1988) system approach. We consider 
all possible lag orders selected by the model selection criteria, namely the Akaike Information 
Criterion, the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion, the Final Prediction Error Criterion, 
and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. These criteria are asymptotically equivalent but 
their results may vary in small samples. In theory, selecting the number of lagged differences 
to be smaller than the correct one will distort the size of the tests, while selecting orders greater 
                                                          
13 Given that in the VECM, all variables are allowed to be endogenous by definition, we use the federal funds rate 
instead of the Taylor rule residuals that we used as an instrumental variable above (e.g., Buch, Eickmeier, and 
Prieto, 2010). Note that since the impact of policy shocks is through bank risk (either credit risk or noninterest 
income), the inclusion of the federal funds rate as an independent variable in equations (7) and (8) would not have 
any implications for the modelling choices in identifying the optimal level of bank risk. If anything, this would 
be owing to multicollineartiy, which we do not find to be present.  
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than the correct one will result in loss of power. Given the sample size, the maximum possible 
lag order is set to four.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
When testing for the rank of the full system at the 5% level, the results show two 
cointegrating vectors if the selected lag length is one and one cointegrating vector if the selected 
lag length is two. We end up choosing a lag length equal to two, because selecting a lagged 
order smaller than the true results in inconsistent tests. Thus, our analysis considers the 
following (one) cointegrating relationship:  
[1 𝛽1 𝛽2   𝛽3] [
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑟
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
].       (11) 
The tests so far provide evidence in favor of a long-run equilibrium between the four 
variables; however, this equilibrium must be estimated. In other words, we need to estimate 
the cointegrating vector, i.e., the betas in equation (11). These betas exist inside the matrix 𝐹 
in model (10). Thus, we estimate the VECM using the reduced rank procedure of Johansen 
(1995) and provide the estimation results in Table 12. For the optimal lag order, we again 
consider all four information criteria. However, these criteria disagree, providing values equal 
to either zero (for the Schwartz criterion) or four (for the other three). We choose the most 
general order of four lags.  
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
Table 12 reports the estimation results of the cointegrating vector. Based on the 
estimation results we can rewrite the cointegrating relationship as: 
output = -0.352*ffr - 15.982*realized risk + 22.819*optimal risk             (12) 
The above coefficients can be interpreted in the following way: in the long run, where the 
system is in equilibrium, an increase by 1% in the federal funds rate will result in a 0.352% 
drop in output growth. All coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
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post-estimation Lagrange-multiplier tests by Johansen (1995) show that there is no 
autocorrelation in the residuals.14 The Jarque-Bera test for normality does not reject the null 
hypothesis of normal residuals in any of the four equations.15 Finally, we examine the stability 
of the coefficients of the model to guarantee that these are not affected by structural breaks. In 
Figure 8 we show the results for the recursive eigenvalue test of Hansen and Johansen (1999). 
The test does not reject the hypothesis of the long-run parameter stability of the eigenvalue at 
the 5% level.  
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
 Besides the long-run equilibrium, from the estimated VECM model we also infer the 
short-run adjustment mechanism that describes how the variables will react when they are 
pushed out of the long-run equilibrium by an exogenous shock or innovation. The following 
analysis uses the estimated VECM to examine how variables in the system respond to a shock 
(impulse) in one of them. We are primarily interested in the orthogonal impulse responses 
involving the theoretical considerations discussed in Section 5.1, which we present in Figures 
9 to 11. Figure 9 shows that the realized credit risk responds positively and significantly to a 
positive change in the optimal credit risk. This effect is apparent even from Figure 1 and is 
intuitive: When banks view that their optimal strategy to maximize profits is to take on higher 
credit risks, they are willing to do so in the next quarter.   
[Insert Figures 9-11 about here] 
 Figure 10 shows the response of the realized credit risk to a monetary policy shock. In 
the first five to six quarters, a monetary contraction (rise in the interest rate) reduces banks’ 
risk and vice versa. This result confirms the findings of the empirical literature on the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy (Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro, 2009; Delis, Hasan and 
                                                          
14 The p-values for two additional lags are 0.076 and 0.41. 
15 The Jarque-Bera p-values for the four equations are 0.28, 0.06, 0.39, and 0.46. 
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Mylonidis, 2011). However, Figure 11 shows that a negative monetary policy shock (rise in 
the interest rate) raises the optimal risk-weighted assets of banks. The response is a positive 
and statistically significant one, which lasts over the long-term. The level of the increase is also 
economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate will 
increase the optimal risk-weighted assets by approximately 0.010 points in the first year and 
for each year thereafter. For a bank with an optimal level of risk-weighted assets, as given by 
specification (4) of Table 4, this will imply a rise of the optimal level from 0.711 to 0.723, 
which is indeed a large fluctuation for one year. 
 An explanation for this finding is that a reduction in the policy rate leads to lower 
deposit rates. Because the loan demand is negatively sloped, the reduction in deposit rates is 
only partially passed to the lending rates. This increases the intermediation margin and provides 
banks with incentives to take on higher risks, because expected profits will also be higher. 
Given the implications of Figure 10, banks will do so in the next period, and this diminishes 
the original negative shock presented in Figure 11 after period six. Thus, we offer an additional 
mechanism working along with the negative effect of monetary policy on banks’ risk.  
 The most interesting implication of this case comes from the fact that a monetary policy 
shock tends to pull the realized and the optimal credit risk further apart in the short run. Phrased 
differently, the optimal monetary policy from a business-cycle perspective will always widen 
the gap between the realized and optimal credit risk of banks, pushing banks out of equilibrium. 
To see this, consider the following sequence of events. In good economic periods, interest rates 
are higher to prevent the economy from over-burning. Based on our impulse responses, the rise 
in interest rates will lower the realized credit risk (Figure 10) and increase the optimal credit 
risk (Figure 11). Given that in these periods, the optimal credit risk is usually higher than the 
realized credit risk (Figure 1), the gap between the two widens. A similar result emerges in bad 
economic periods, where the optimal monetary policy is to cut rates. This leads to an increase 
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in the realized credit risk and a fall in the optimal credit risk. Given that in these periods, the 
realized risk is higher than the optimal risk, the result is again a widening in the gap between 
the two. 
 Another mechanism through which changes in the monetary policy rate distort the 
equilibrium risk behavior of banks relates to the interest-rate risk. This is the risk that the value 
of real assets will change owing to a change in the absolute level of interest rates, in the spread 
between two rates, in the shape of the yield curve, or in any other interest rate relationship. 
Naturally, all these interest rates are affected by the central bank rate. Our analysis is then 
consistent with the idea that following a monetary policy shock, it takes banks considerable 
time to adjust their valuation of assets and determine the optimal level of credit risk. In the 
meantime, the average bank either does not have the capacity to estimate the effect of interest-
rate risk on its portfolio and determine its actual level of credit risk in the very short run or 
maturity mismatch does not allow the bank to quickly adjust in light of the monetary shock. 
This is also the essence of the theoretical model of Agur and Demertzis (2013) who show that 
because bank risk cannot be easily adjusted in the short run, monetary policy cuts should be 
short-lived to prevent excessive risk buildup.  
In the VECM presented above, one can include a measure of bank capitalization or 
other macroeconomic variables, such as the inflation rate or a measure of monetary aggregates. 
This exercise yields very similar results, which are available on request. In addition, one can 
use the rest of the time series produced by the other specifications in Tables 8 and 9 or the 
equivalent ones in Tables 4-7. Again, the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
One can further infer on the effect of the monetary-policy-induced disequilibrium in banks’ 
optimal risky strategy on real output. Our results show that the widening of the gap increases 
output in good economic times and decreases output in bad economic times. In other words, 
monetary policy can increase macroeconomic fluctuations through its impact on 
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“disequilibrium banking.” However, we should treat this result with caution as general 
implications for the real economy would probably need a more lengthy time series with 
additional business cycles. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy considerations 
This paper identifies for the first time the level of banks’ credit risk that maximizes profits 
using the full sample of US banks over the period 1996Q1–2011Q4. This optimal (equilibrium) 
level of credit risk is different from the actual realized credit risk present in bank portfolios and 
reflects the level of credit risk a bank would take if it were to function in a fully-efficient profit-
maximizing way and perfectly forecast the upcoming macroeconomic conditions, while 
prudential regulation would assist banks toward these goals. This “idyllic” situation would 
essentially reduce the probability of default to a minimum, primarily by reducing the effects of 
maturity mismatch and fluctuating asymmetric information on the probability of bank default.  
 We show that the optimal credit risk for the average bank leads the business cycle, 
while the realized credit risk closely follows the business cycle. In good economic periods, 
which are characterized by credit expansion, the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized 
risk, while this picture completely reverses in bad economic periods. Subsequently, using an 
error correction model, we demonstrate that the optimal monetary policy in smoothing the 
business cycle always leads to an increase in the gap between the equilibrium and realized 
credit risk of banks. This is because a contractionary monetary policy in good economic 
periods, where the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized risk, decreases the realized 
credit risk but increases the optimal credit risk. Similarly, an expansionary monetary policy in 
bad economic periods, where the optimal credit risk is lower than the realized risk, increases 
the realized credit risk but decreases the optimal credit risk. 
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 In essence, our results offer another point in favor of the proponents of counter-cyclical 
bank regulation in the form of capital requirements and of those suggesting that monetary 
policy should lean against the wind. The obvious implication is that monetary policy and 
prudential regulation need to be closely linked to prevent the disequilibrium situation described 
in this paper. In fact, there are three choices: the conduct of monetary policy will incorporate 
elements of bank risk and financial stability or prudential bank regulation will be cyclical, or 
both. Strong steps toward the implementation of monetary policy within a framework that 
encompasses elements of prudent bank behavior have recently been enacted by the European 
Single Supervisory Mechanism. Within this mechanism, the prudent behavior of systemic 
European banks and the monetary tasks of the European Central Bank take place in the same 
body (the Governing council), awarding monetary policy a flavor of financial stability for the 
first time in the history of the European Monetary Union. 
These suggestions have their own merits and drawbacks and the literature on this issue 
is flourishing. For example, Angeloni and Faia (2010) employ a standard dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium framework extended to incorporate the banking sector and show that the 
best policy (out of a set of policies that they consider) for crisis prevention is the combination 
of mild anti-cyclical capital requirements and a monetary policy that reacts to inflation and 
“leans-against-the-winds.” Similar results are obtained by Gambacorta and Signoretti (2012). 
It is apparent that more work is required on the real outcomes of the pass-through of monetary 
policy through banks. It is also apparent that the implementation of the new banking regulation 
regime under Basel III should consider the effects of monetary policy in shaping equilibrium 
bank behavior.     
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
   
A. Dependent variables 
 
Return on assets (ROA) Total bank profits before tax/ total assets Call reports 
Return on equity (ROE) Equity capital/ total assets Call reports 
 
 
B. Explanatory variables 
   
Risk weighted assets Risk-weighted assets/ total assets Call reports 
Risk-based capital ratio Total risk-based capital/ risk weighted assets Call reports 
Bank size Natural logarithm of real total assets Call reports 
Capital Equity capital/ total assets Call reports 
Liquidity Liquid assets (cash and short-term government bonds)/ total assets Call reports 
Non-interest income Non-interest income/ total income Call reports 
Problem loans Non-performing loans (>90 days)/ total loans Call reports 
Provisions Loan loss provisions/ total loans Call reports 
Growth GDP growth rate (annual %) Federal Reserve 
Credit by banks Loans provided by commercial banks/ GDP Federal Reserve 
Federal funds rate The effective federal funds rate Federal Reserve 
CPI 
Delinquent loans 
Commercial loans 
Loans to individuals 
Consumer Price Index 
30-89 days delinquent loans/ total loans 
Commercial loans/ total loans 
Loans to individuals/ total loans 
Federal Reserve 
Call reports 
Call reports 
Call reports 
Real estate loans Real estate loans/ total loans Call reports 
Other loans Other loans/ total loans Call reports 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 574,532 0.007 0.010 -0.257 0.488 
ROE 574,532 0.077 0.103 -1.994 1.970 
Risk-weighted assets 574,532 0.670 0.132 0.100 0.998 
Risk-based capital ratio 574,532 0.178 0.136 -0.344 9.228 
Bank size 574,532 11.786 1.367 6.889 21.584 
Capital 574,532 0.107 0.053 -0.242 1.000 
Liquidity 574,532 0.060 0.063 0.000 0.909 
Non-interest income 574,532 0.111 0.087 0.000 1.000 
Problem loans 574,532 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.748 
Provisions 574,532 0.015 0.010 0.000 0.748 
Growth 574,532 0.024 0.020 -0.046 0.052 
Credit by banks 526,497 959.1 354.2 510.7 1,796.4 
Federal funds rate 574,532 3.245 2.139 0.073 6.520 
Consumer price index 574,532 0.610 0.529 -2.300 1.600 
Delinquent loans 
Commercial loans 
329,126 
99,820 
0.013 
0.142 
0.014 
0.089 
0.000 
0.000 
0.385 
0.929 
Loans to individuals 99,820 0.077 0.074 0.000 0.966 
Real estate loans 99,820 0.680 0.178 0.007 0.999 
Other loans 99,820 0.100 0.132 0.000 0.855 
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Table 3.2 
Correlations matrix for the sample containing the delinquent loans data and controls 
     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Risk-weighted assets 1.000                 
2. Risk-based capital ratio -0.608 1.000                
3. Bank size 0.2548 -0.3049 1.000               
4. Capital -0.2218 0.7801 -0.229 1.000              
5. Liquidity -0.2285 0.2116 -0.2518 0.0949 1.000             
6. Non-interest income 0.0258 -0.1278 0.2736 -0.1345 0.0522 1.000            
7. Problem loans 0.0685 -0.0375 0.0242 -0.0115 0.0139 0.0108 1.000           
8. Provisions -0.1502 0.3217 -0.1423 0.2409 0.1081 0.0005 0.3023 1.000          
9. Growth -0.0594 0.043 -0.0464 0.0072 -0.0341 0.0586 -0.1808 0.0108 1.000         
10. Federal funds rate 0.0365 0.0113 -0.015 0.0097 -0.1092 -0.1156 -0.1573 -0.0589 0.2924 1.000        
11. Credit by banks -0.0238 0.0015 -0.0471 -0.0144 -0.0153 -0.1152 -0.0532 -0.0212 -0.268 0.306 1.000       
12. CPI 0.0071 0.0143 -0.008 0.0108 -0.0458 0.0053 -0.0694 -0.0123 0.3903 0.2985 -0.1182 1.000      
13. Delinquent loans -0.1131 0.1181 -0.1782 0.0835 0.0575 -0.0577 0.1974 0.1453 -0.0622 -0.0249 0.0394 -0.0328 1.000     
14. Commercial loans 0.0069 0.1151 -0.0237 0.0717 0.0599 0.0304 0.0021 0.1638 0.0126 0.005 0.0079 0.0019 -0.0072 1.000    
15. Loans to individuals -0.2414 0.27 -0.1928 0.1256 0.1292 0.0696 -0.0559 0.1699 0.0451 0.0078 0.0691 0.0009 0.1707 0.557 1.000   
16. Real Estate loans -0.0258 0.0906 0.043 0.0374 0.0464 0.0246 -0.0036 0.0867 0.0011 -0.0051 -0.016 0.001 -0.017 0.7826 0.4342 1.000  
17. Other loans 0.0008 0.1524 -0.3527 0.1814 0.0833 -0.1629 -0.0148 0.1727 -0.0041 -0.0032 0.001 -0.0017 -0.0164 0.168 0.0875 0.0551 1.000 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Full Sample Correlations matrix  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Risk-weighted assets 1.000            
2. Risk-based capital ratio -0.453 1.000           
3. Bank size 0.229 -0.252 1.000          
4. Capital -0.174 0.822 -0.237 1.000         
5. Liquidity -0.269 0.222 -0.203 0.121 1.000        
6. Non-interest income 0.007 -0.026 0.275 -0.013 0.095 1.000       
7. Problem loans 0.048 -0.046 0.001 -0.032 0.067 0.021 1.000      
8. Provisions -0.053 0.172 -0.036 0.147 0.123 0.111 0.326 1.000     
9. Growth -0.130 0.042 -0.153 0.004 -0.008 -0.052 -0.164 -0.021 1.000    
10. Federal funds rate -0.065 0.051 -0.183 0.268 -0.089 -0.169 -0.201 -0.087 0.540 1.000   
11. Credit by banks -0.153 0.049 -0.228 0.003 0.022 -0.158  -0.107 -0.021 0.437 0.696 1.000  
12. CPI 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.007 -0.042 0.008 -0.051 -0.018 0.281 0.169 -0.090 1.000 
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Table 4 
Optimal bank credit risk: Basic specifications 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROE ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.566*** 
(70.899) 
0.551*** 
(64.012) 
0.513*** 
(54.055) 
0.503*** 
(49.960) 
0.488*** 
(48.452) 
0.492*** 
(48.236) 
0.483*** 
(46.085) 
0.480*** 
(35.473) 
0.882*** 
(20.973) 
 0.508*** 
(52.091) 
0.503*** 
(49.967) 
ROE t-1 
 
         0.521*** 
(78.613) 
  
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.048*** 
(15.107) 
0.056*** 
(16.675) 
0.033*** 
(10.726) 
0.037*** 
(11.846) 
0.040*** 
(12.784) 
0.044*** 
(11.913) 
0.043*** 
(11.736) 
0.748*** 
(5.981) 
0.186*** 
(3.270) 
0.139*** 
(7.361) 
0.035*** 
(10.469) 
0.040*** 
(12.860) 
Risk-weighted assets2 t-1 -0.036*** 
(-15.298) 
-0.039*** 
(-16.187) 
-0.024*** 
(-10.853) 
-0.026*** 
(-11.500) 
-0.028*** 
(-12.255) 
-0.032*** 
(-11.758) 
-0.030*** 
(-11.228) 
-0.530*** 
(-6.014) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.137) 
-0.097*** 
(-6.858) 
-0.026*** 
(-10.583) 
-0.028*** 
(-12.572) 
Bank size t-1   -0.001*** 
(-14.341) 
0.001*** 
(11.999) 
0.001*** 
(12.680) 
0.000*** 
(4.269) 
0.001*** 
(11.459) 
-0.003*** 
(-6.825) 
0.005 
(1.029) 
0.005*** 
(7.112) 
0.001*** 
(13.995) 
0.001*** 
(11.993) 
Capital t-1   -0.018*** 
(-16.383) 
-0.013*** 
(-11.323) 
-0.012*** 
(-10.831) 
-0.015*** 
(-12.456) 
-0.012*** 
(-10.175) 
0.013*** 
(2.435) 
0.068** 
(2.369) 
-0.093*** 
(-15.836) 
 -0.015*** 
(-9.074) 
Risk-based capital ratio t-1           -0.004*** 
(-7.207) 
0.001* 
(1.850) 
Liquidity t-1   -0.003*** 
(-6.118) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.121) 
-0.003*** 
(-7.738) 
-0.004*** 
(-7.464) 
-0.004*** 
(-8.271) 
0.020*** 
(4.684) 
0.022 
(0.608) 
-0.027*** 
(-7.724) 
-0.002*** 
(-4.201) 
-0.002*** 
(-5.258) 
Non-interest income t-1   0.006*** 
(9.214) 
0.008*** 
(12.308) 
0.008*** 
(11.755) 
0.008*** 
(11.781) 
0.008*** 
(11.416) 
0.003*** 
(4.070) 
0.013 
(0.624) 
0.063*** 
(12.501) 
0.008*** 
(12.160) 
0.008*** 
(12.348) 
Problem loans t-1   -0.079*** 
(-30.994) 
-0.069*** 
(-28.153) 
-0.072*** 
(-28.938) 
-0.076*** 
(-28.655) 
-0.074*** 
(-27.756) 
-0.087*** 
(-27.757) 
-0.094 
(-0.931) 
-0.896*** 
(-28.057) 
-0.068*** 
(-28.000) 
-0.069*** 
(-28.182) 
Provisions t-1   0.005 
(0.576) 
0.000 
(-0.022) 
-0.005 
(-0.606) 
-0.004 
(-0.456) 
-0.009 
(-0.960) 
0.082*** 
(4.892) 
0.443 
(1.332) 
-0.299*** 
(-4.937) 
0.002 
(0.276) 
-0.001 
(-0.128) 
Growth t-1      0.032*** 
(38.715) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.146) 
     
Credit by banks t-1      0.000* 
(12.631) 
0.000*** 
(8.191) 
     
Optimal point 0.666*** 0.717*** 0.687*** 0.711*** 0.714*** 0.687*** 0.716*** 0.700*** 0.727*** 0.715*** 0.689*** 0.710*** 
Quarter fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No Yes No Yes No No No No No 
Observations 557,179 557,179 557,179 557,179 557,179 509,445 509,445 540,550 508,512 557,179 557,179 557,179 
R-square (overall) 0.330 0.373 0.356 0.390 0.363 0.359 0.364   0.378 0.388 0.390 
UIT (p-value)        0.000     
WIT (Wald statistic)        28.742     
OIT (p-value)        0.354 0.379    
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of variants of equation (7). All variables are defined in Table 1. Regressions (1) to (7) and (10) to 
(12) are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors. Regression (8) is estimated with LIML on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors. Regression 
(9) is estimated with the Arellano and Bond (1991) first difference GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors. UIT is the p-value of the under-identification LM test by Kleibergen 
and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must 
be relatively high (higher than 10 as a rule of thumb) to reject the null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by Hansen, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively.   
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Optimal bank credit risk: Risk measured by delinquent loans 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROE 
ROA t-1 0.932*** 0.911***  
 (7.312) (7.505)  
ROE t-1   0.993*** 
   (7.793) 
Deliquent loans t-1 0.224* 0.238* 2.609** 
 (1.806) (1.715) (2.019) 
Deliquent loans2 t-1 -6.769* -7.125*   -90.303** 
 (-1.850) (-1.755)   (-2.008)   
Risk-weighted assets t-1 -0.060** -0.059** -0.385 
 (-2.243) (-2.358) (-1.592) 
Bank size t-1 0.011 0.007 0.082 
 (0.929) (0.636) (0.748)   
Capital t-1 0.207** 0.183** 2.052** 
 (2.563) (2.302) (2.474) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.047 -0.042 -0.336 
 (-0.965) (-0.959) (-0.715) 
Non-interest income t-1 -0.004 0.003   -0.250 
 (-0.065) (0.063) (-0.618) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.342 -0.315 -3.089 
 (-1.590) (-1.607) (-1.391) 
Provisions t-1 -1.076   -0.811 -3.118   
 (-0.908) (-0.736) (-0.269)   
Commercial loans t-1  0.005 0.011 
  (0.735) (0.137) 
Loans to individuals t-1  -0.018 0.014 
  (-0.459) (0.037)    
Loans to real estate t-1  0.000  0.002 
  (0.160) (0.214)   
Optimal point 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
Observations 170,973 170,973 170,973 
OIT (p-value) 0.632 0.547 0.635 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (7). Risk is measured by the delinquent-
loans ratio. All variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated 
with the Arellano and Bond (1991) first difference GMM for dynamic panels 
and robust standard errors. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Optimal bank credit risk: Other sensitivity analyses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.378*** 0.252**  0.489*** 0.507*** 
 (3.295) (2.209)  (47.470) (46.743) 
Risk-weighted assetst-1 2.523*** 0.870*** 0.068***   
 (7.406) (2.586) (14.197)   
Risk-weighted assets2t-1 -1.837*** -0.610*** -0.047***   
 (-7.423) (-2.755) (-13.557)   
Risk-weighted assets t-4     0.011*** 
     (4.256) 
Risk-weighted assets2 t-4     -0.009*** 
     (-4.347) 
Σ(Risk-weighted assets t-
1…t-3) 
   0.036***  
    (10.288)  
Σ(Risk-weighted assets2 
t-1…t-3) 
   -0.026***  
    (-10.230)  
Bank size t-1 -0.002*** -0.008** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000   
 (-3.117) (-2.087) (17.571) (11.061) (1.448) 
Capital t-1 -0.001 0.024 -0.031*** -0.004** -0.007*** 
 (-0.051) (0.785) (-16.059)   (-2.390) (-8.561) 
Liquidity t-1 0.069*** 0.045 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001 
 (5.652) (1.469) (-5.526) (-5.547) (-1.499) 
Non-interest income t-1 0.004 0.048* 0.021*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 
 (0.302) (1.886) (15.578) (12.829) (4.708) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.073* -0.108 -0.120*** -0.069*** -0.043*** 
 (-1.841) (-1.388) (-32.148) (-27.390) (-17.579) 
Provisions t-1 0.292*** 0.511 -0.040*** -0.012 0.002 
 (2.722) (1.549) (-2.819) (-1.468) (0.380) 
Optimal point 0.686*** 0.713*** 0.721*** 0.687*** 0.668***   
Observations 118,996 37,613 557,179 524,389 511,173 
R-square (overall)   0.172 0.372 0.356 
OIT (p-value) 0.485 0.601    
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of 
variants of equation (7). Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated with the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) first difference GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors. Regressions (3) to 
(5) are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust standard errors.   In regression 
(1) all variables are annual averages of quarterly observations and include annual fixed effects. 
In regression (2) all variables are bi-annual averages of quarterly observations and include bi-
annual fixed effects. Regression (3) does not have a lagged dependent variable.  Regressions 
(4) and (5) consider alternative lag structures. Regressions (3)-(5) include quarter fixed effects. 
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
Optimal bank credit risk: Specific bank groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.558*** 0.480*** 0.483*** 0.494*** 
 (20.031) (36.105) (23.219)   (57.114) 
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.026   0.038*** 0.045*** 0.021*** 
 (1.494) (9.249) (8.238)   (4.215) 
Risk-weighted assets2 t-1 -0.020 -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.015*** 
 (-1.597) (-8.947) (-8.088) (-4.036) 
Bank size t-1 0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*   
 (1.254) (10.589) (7.659)     (1.714) 
Capital t-1   0.009   -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.002 
 (1.215) (-11.176) (-4.901) (-0.894) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.004** -0.002***    -0.002** -0.005*** 
 (-2.054)   (-3.683) (-2.459) (-5.415)   
Non-interest income t-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 
 (4.193) (7.196)   (7.207) (8.533) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.060*** -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.066*** 
    (-6.195) (-22.872) (-11.863) (-18.716) 
Provisions t-1 -0.001 0.012 0.027** -0.119*** 
 (-0.038)    (1.190) (2.262) (-12.579) 
Constant -0.010 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.004** 
 (-1.639) (-10.637) (-6.810) (-2.147) 
Optimal point 0.640*** 0.714*** 0.710*** 0.680*** 
Observations 55,345 279,334 139,143 138,854 
R-square (overall) 0.441 0.375 0.352 0.461 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (7). All variables are defined in Table 1. All 
regressions are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust standard 
errors and include quarter fixed effects. Regression (1) is based on a subsample of 
banks that have total assets above the 90% percentile.  Regression (2) is based on 
a subsample of banks that have total assets below the 50% percentile. Regression 
(3) is based on a subsample of banks that have a total risk-based capital ratio above 
the 75% percentile. Regression (4) is based on a subsample of banks that have a 
total risk-based capital ratio below the 25% percentile. The ***, **, and * marks 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Percentiles for the sample splitting variables of Table 7.  
Variable/Percentiles 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
Total Assets 21,245.725 29,813.602 54,624.621 113,857.16 263,845.77 656,849.37 1,237,445.8 
Risk-Based Capital Ratio 0.111 0.116 0.129 0.153 0.197 0.263 0.326 
Notes: The table contains percentiles of per bank, across time, averages of total assets and risk-based capital ratios. Total assets are 
in thousands of dollars. 
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Table 9 
Optimal bank credit risk: Time-varying models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable ROA ROE ROA 
ROA t-1 0.511***  0.106*** 
 (51.009)  (2.597) 
ROE t-1  0.524***  
  (79.098)  
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.002*** 0.003  
 (3.565) (0.637)  
Risk-weighted assets2 t-1 -0.016*** -0.132***  
 (-4.482) (-5.374)  
Delinquent loanst-1     41.416*** 
   (4.921)   
Delinquent loans2t-1   267.396*** 
   (3.637) 
Risk-weighted assets t-1   -0.004 
   (-0.453) 
Bank size t-1 0.001*** 0.005*** -0.017** 
 (11.915) (6.880)   (-2.118) 
Capital t-1 -0.012*** -0.097*** 0.024 
 (-10.853) (-16.261) (1.108) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.002*** -0.027*** 0.013 
 (-5.874) (-7.841) (0.992) 
Non-interest income t-1 0.008*** 0.063*** -0.103*** 
 (12.368) (12.576) (-5.938) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.068*** -0.890*** -0.100** 
 (-28.224) (-28.082) (-2.406) 
Provisions t-1 -0.001 -0.305*** 0.332*** 
 (-0.115) (-5.027) (3.477) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.020***  
 (30.818) (29.218)  
Observations 557,179 557,179 184,059 
R-square (overall) 0.407 0.385  
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (8). All variables are defined in Table 1. In 
regressions (1) and (2) estimation method is OLS on the fixed effects model with 
robust standard errors. Regression (3) is estimated with the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
first difference GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors.  All regressions 
include quarter fixed effects. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Time-varying models: Specific bank groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA 
ROA t-1 0.555*** 0.511*** 0.494*** 0.496*** 
 (21.212) (51.009) (24.034) (57.475) 
Risk-weighted assets t-1 0.002 0.002*** 0.002 0.002** 
 (1.028) (3.565)   (1.562) (2.133) 
Risk-weighted assets2 t-1 -0.006 -0.016*** -0.012* -0.013* 
 (-0.581) (-4.482) (-1.881) (-1.920) 
Bank size t-1 0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000 
 (1.201) (11.915) (7.757) (1.582) 
Capital t-1 0.010   -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.002    
 (1.579)   (-10.853) (-4.680) (-0.865) 
Liquidity t-1 -0.004** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.288) (-5.874)   (-3.162)   (-5.455)   
Non-interest income t-1 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 
 (4.146) (12.368) (7.368)  (8.593) 
Problem loans t-1 -0.060*** -0.068*** -0.059*** -0.066*** 
 (-6.024) (-28.224) (-12.043) (-18.807) 
Provisions t-1 -0.002 -0.001 0.026** -0.118*** 
 (-0.075) (-0.115) (2.187) (-12.509) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (6.166) (30.818) (19.027) (12.525) 
Observations 55,345 557,179 139,143 138,854 
R-square (overall) 0.451 0.407 0.380 0.466 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the 
estimation of variants of equation (8). All variables are defined in Table 1.  All 
regressions are estimated with OLS on the fixed effects model with robust standard 
errors and include quarter fixed effects. Regression (1) is based on a subsample of 
banks that have total assets above the 90% percentile.  Regression (2) is based on 
a subsample of banks that have total assets below the 50% percentile. Regression 
(3) is based on a subsample of banks that have a total risk-based capital ratio above 
the 75% percentile. Regression (4) is based on a subsample of banks that have a 
total risk-based capital ratio below the 25% percentile. The ***, **, and * marks 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 11  
Unit root tests 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller GLS Dickey-Fuller 
 Coefficient 5% critical value Coefficient 5% Critical Value 
Output (2) -2.063  -2.921 0.828  -2.210 
Federal funds rate (2) -2.166 -2.921 -1.711 -2.210 
Realized risk (6) -1.612 -2.924 -1.245 -2.112 
Optimal risk (2) -1.766 -2.922 -1.269 -2.215 
Notes: The table reports the augmented and GLS Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, along with their 5% 
critical values. The number of lags for each series is determined by information criteria and is in the 
parenthesis next to the variable. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12  
Cointegration vector 
 Output Federal funds rate Realized risk Optimal risk 
Coefficient 1.000 0.352 15.982 -22.819 
Standard deviation 0.000 0.061 5.470 4.776 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Notes: The table reports the cointegration vector given by equation (11) of the VECM given by equation (10). 
The VECM is estimated using the one stage approach of Johansen (1995). The sample spans the period 1997Q3 
to 2011Q4. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk  
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk of failed banks 
 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk vs. average credit risk based on delinquent loans 
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Figure 4: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of large banks (total assets>90% of sample average) 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of small banks (total assets<50% of sample average) 
 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of well-capitalized banks (capital>75% of sample 
average) 
 
 
 
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1996b 1997d 1999b 2000d 2002b 2003d 2005b 2006d 2008b 2009d 2011b
Optimal Risk Weighted Assets BB Mean Risk Weighted Assets
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1996b 1997d 1999b 2000d 2002b 2003d 2005b 2006d 2008b 2009d 2011b
Optimal Risk Weighted Assets SB Mean Risk Weighted Assets
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1996b 1997d 1999b 2000d 2002b 2003d 2005b 2006d 2008b 2009d 2011b
Optimal Risk Weighted Assets TBTF Mean Risk Weighted Assets
52 
 
Figure 7 
Evolution of the optimal bank credit risk of poorly-capitalized banks (capital<25% of sample average) 
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Figure 8 
Stability of the time-series model 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The upper part of the figure shows the recursively estimated largest eigenvalue (solid line), and its 
confidence interval (dashed lines), based on sample moments from an increasing fraction of the sample. The lower 
part of the figure shows that the recursive Tau statistics (solid line) never crosses the 95% critical value (dashed 
line) and, therefore, the null hypothesis of parameter constancy cannot be rejected. 
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Figure 9 
Impulse response of risk-weighted assets to a shock in optimal risk-weighted assets 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
Impulse response of risk-weighted assets to a monetary policy shock 
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Figure 11 
Impulse response of optimal risk-weighted assets to a monetary policy shock 
 
 
 
 
